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3Reinventing Chinese political history 
Mr Rector Magnificus, honoured guests, zeer gewaardeerde 
toehoorders,
An inaugural lecture is a rite of passage, a moment of 
transition from one career stage into another, and thus also a 
moment of coming out. Looking back on the twenty-odd years 
I have so far spent in the field of Chinese studies, it turns out 
that most of this time has been spent on political history. This 
is not an entirely comforting realization. Jane Austen (1775-
1817), writing at a time when historical writing was primarily 
concerned with the facts of high politics, said through the 
voice of one of her heroines: “I wish I were [fond of history] 
too. I read it a little as a duty, but it tells me nothing that does 
not either vex or weary me. The quarrels of popes and kings, 
with wars or pestilences, in every page; the men all so good for 
nothing, and hardly any women at all - it is very tiresome”.1 Let 
me start out with some observations about the development 
of political history more generally; I will then turn to some key 
questions in imperial Chinese political history that occupy me. 
In the post-WWII era the kind of weariness that Catherine 
Morland articulated in a short early nineteenth-century novel 
spread more widely. The number of historians placing their 
work in the field of political history declined precipitously. 
Some have tried to stem the haemorrhage by declaring the 
death of traditional political history and by announcing the 
arrival of “the new political history”. 
What is this new political history? Judging from past attempts 
by American, Canadian, and European historians at redefining 
political history, the new political history marked a departure 
from traditional narrative political history focused on major 
events, the lives of leaders, and the development of institutions. 
First political historians adopted quantitative methods 
designed to test hypotheses concerning political behaviors 
such as voting and legislative action. Dissatisfaction with 
cliometrics in turn led political historians to engage with the 
new social history. In the 1960s its proponents had turned their 
attention to individuals and social groups forgotten in history 
including the working class and women as well as to aspects 
of social life such as the family, labor, or urban living. This 
kind of social history was new because it was no longer “the 
history of people with the politics left out” as one of its early 
practitioners, George Macaulay Trevelyan, Regius Professor 
of Modern History at Cambridge University, had famously 
described and practiced it.2 For the new social historians 
power was a central concept and they were interested in the 
historical impact of social power on political institutions 
and decisions rather than the other way around. The rise of 
cultural history in the 1980s resulted in another redefinition of 
political history.3 Cultural historians challenged historians’ and 
social scientists’ basic concepts (e.g., class) and assumptions 
about historical development. They underscored the need for 
greater self-awareness amongst researchers by having them 
probe the history of the experiences, representations, and 
meanings of core values, ideas, and practices. Politics remained 
a central concern as key advocates of the cultural historical 
turn including Lynn Hunt, currently Distinguished Research 
Professor and Eugen Weber Endowed Chair in Modern 
European History at the University of California, Los Angeles, 
wrote in illuminating ways on the languages and rituals of 
politics - in Hunt’s case of the French Revolution.4
The “new political history” appears then mostly as a contested 
term. I haven’t exhausted all the varieties - throughout the 
last three decades there have also been voices from historians 
calling for stronger methodological connections with political 
science or at least some subfields within political science, for 
example.5 It is clear, however, from the succession of new 
histories that these attempts at redefinition may not have been 
entirely successful. Few amongst the new social and cultural 
historians delving into politics would include political history 
amongst their research fields. 
A sense of crisis has also been felt among those working 
on Chinese political history in Europe and North America. 
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Already in 1971 Benjamin Schwartz, Leroy B. Williams 
Professor of History and Political Science at Harvard 
University, wrote “A Brief Defense of Political and Intellectual 
History... with Particular Reference to Non-Western Cultures”.6 
Schwartz mostly wrote on early Chinese thought and 
twentieth-century Chinese political and intellectual history 
and it is within this context that we have to understand what 
at first appears to be an endorsement of the kind of criticisms 
that political historians were facing: “certainly, any effort to 
make sense of the political history of mainland China in the 
last twenty years could hardly depend entirely on the history 
of institutions, constitutions, and formal organizations”. 
Instead Schwartz underscored the importance of and pointed 
to a different direction for modern Chinese political history 
by adding: “and yet we are dealing with a history in which 
there is considerable truth in the assertion that ‘politics are 
in command’. If this phrase has any meaning within the 
context of contemporary China, it must refer not simply or 
even primarily to institutions but to categories such as policy, 
decision-making, power relations, and the interplay between 
ideas and political action”.7 Lest this quote makes it seem that 
Schwartz was an early advocate of cultural history but had 
missed out on the new social history, I should add that in this 
brief defense he countered the standard critique of elitism by 
placing political participation on vastly enlarged geographic 
and social scales. Political history was for him not only or not 
even primarily about the policies and decisions of a tiny elite in 
government centers and at the national level; it encompassed 
power relations in villages and counties as well as peasant 
organization and uprisings, the activities of religious clergy, 
merchants, secret societies, and other stakeholders. 
That was 1971. Some may argue that in the last thirty years 
politics has been far less in command but I suspect that most 
would agree that politics remains critical in Chinese society. 
However that may be, not much has been written on the state 
of Chinese political history since then, so where is the field 
now and where shall it go? I shall try in the remainder of my 
talk to outline some ways in which key aspects of Chinese 
political life in the late imperial era have been and will 
continue to be reinvented. At the risk of conflating my own 
personal experience with that of an entire field, I will do so 
mainly on the basis of my own work over the last twenty years. 
I used to agree with Catherine Morland that it would be nice 
to be fond of history but that it is very tiresome. Fortunately, 
more than 200 years ago she also pointed to a solution: “and 
yet I often think it odd that it should be so dull, for a great 
deal of it must be invention. The speeches that are put into 
the heroes’ mouths, their thoughts and designs - the chief of 
all this must be invention”.8 Like a cultural historian avant la 
lettre Jane Austen’s fictional character had a hunch that history 
dealt not with facts but rather with speech acts. Invention is 
exciting, but political history’s potential does not stop there. 
Professional history is in my experience not so much about 
invention but mostly about reinvention, a reconfiguring of 
events and speech acts recorded in primary sources as well 
as the explanations proposed in the work of other historians 
with a view to shed new light on the past, and, very often, by 
extension, the present.
Institutions revisited: the civil service examinations
My first example may at first glance appear to be a somewhat 
unpromising topic for a new Chinese political history. It 
is a political institution with a long history and a very bad 
reputation: the imperial Chinese civil service examinations. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the 
examinations became a focal point in the critiques of Chinese 
reformers and revolutionaries. In their eyes the examinations 
had neglected to cultivate the skills and failed to produce the 
talent required for the Chinese nation to face its European 
and even its East Asian rivals - the defeat against Japan in the 
mid-1890s was not the first but it was a particularly painful 
reminder of China’s relative position towards other nations. 
Chinese reformers then availed themselves of a technique that 
would also be used by generations of Eurocentric historians. 
The history of an institution that spanned at least 1300 years 
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was telescoped into one coherent and unchanging system, 
an empire-wide system of examinations that allegedly had 
indoctrinated Chinese men for hundreds of years with the 
same old classical texts which bore no relevance to practical 
matters and which students only needed to reproduce from 
memory. Such a system would predictably fall far short 
of the standards of modernizers then and historians of 
modernization later. And so, even though the examinations 
had once been much admired by European visitors to China 
and philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
and even though they may perhaps have served as a point of 
reference for the first written civil examinations in England 
and France, in twentieth-century minds they became a symbol 
for the traditions that had caused China to lag behind other 
nations. 
My first inkling that there was something wrong with this 
widely circulating picture of the examinations came when 
I was reading through commercially printed encyclopedias 
dating to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. According to 
their editors, these encyclopedias, covering all sorts of literary, 
historical, philosophical, and administrative topics were 
based on essays by popular contemporary authors, recent 
government documents, and of course the winning essays 
of the latest examination rounds. These sorts of marketing 
statements were explicitly targeted at men preparing for the 
examinations. Soon I further discovered that the encyclopedias 
were part of a wide range of textbooks, anthologies, atlases, 
and other reference materials expressly compiled for the use 
of students. From existing and referenced materials I could 
thus reconstruct a market in private and commercially printed 
examination manuals. A key question that remained was who 
steered this market: the central government, local governments, 
publishers, or literati in other positions. I concluded that a 
significant shift in power relations between the court and 
the literate elite took place in the late eleventh and twelfth 
centuries. A century earlier, the first Song Dynasty (960-1276) 
emperors and their advisers had revamped the examinations 
of the past as part of series of policies to centralize control, 
but as the examinations became the preferred way to enter 
officialdom and as numbers grew, the power to decide on its 
contents and to shape its cultural influence had to be shared 
with students, teachers, and publishers.
A social transformation spurred this shift in power relations. 
Much has been written about the social transformation of 
Chinese society between the late eighth and the thirteenth 
centuries. Even though there are disagreements about the 
timing, nature, and scope of social change,9 looking back from 
the thirteenth century, it is generally accepted that the political 
elite changed from the hierarchically defined and capital-
based aristocracy of the Tang Dynasty (618-906), to an elite of 
official servants recruited through examinations and focused 
on the capital in the eleventh century, and to an elite claiming 
power in local society in substantial part on the basis of its 
educational and cultural credentials. The numbers matter: 
between the early eleventh century and the early twelfth 
century the number of students sitting for the lower-level 
qualifying examinations grew from about 20,000 to 79,000; 
that number had increased fivefold, to an estimated 400,000, 
by the mid-thirteenth century - and that last number only 
covered the southern half of the Chinese territories.10 Millions 
were preparing and sitting the examinations in the centuries 
that followed. 
We won’t have time to go into much more detail but today I 
want highlight two key observations about the examinations 
and raise a few questions focusing on their role in political 
history. These observations are intended to defamiliarize us 
from the modern context of examinations. The first is that the 
examinations, at least in the early centuries of their existence, 
were a decentralized set of examinations; in other words, 
there were no national standardized tests as exist today. At the 
local levels, examiners, selected from among currently serving 
officials, were appointed ad hoc and made up their own 
questions. There was also, contrary to textbook accounts, no 
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agreed upon curriculum for the various genres and topics that 
were tested. Secondly, the examinations were not supported 
by a nationwide school system that provided education for 
all - official schools could only accommodate a minority of 
students preparing for the examinations; most obtained an 
education through years of family or private tutoring, clan 
schools, academies, or self-study. The implication of this 
is that the examinations and the activities that surrounded 
them (textbook production, teaching, the printing of one’s 
unsuccessful examination papers, networking activities among 
students and officials, and even the occasional uprisings when 
results were announced) ought to be approached as a site in 
which to observe the history and the fluctuations of politics 
and intellectual culture. 
My favorite illustration of this last statement is a series of 
mercifully short examination questions written by one of the 
most famous philosophers in Chinese history, Zhu Xi 朱熹 
(1130-1200), in the 1150s. For example, he posed students at 
the school of Tongan 同安 District (Quanzhou 泉州, Fujian) 
the following essay question: “When people are young they 
learn things, after they have grown up, they want to put 
these things into practice. Can we hear from you, gentlemen, 
what you are learning today and what you will put into 
practice in the future?”.11 This was not an innocent twisting of 
conventions. Essay questions at the time typically numbered 
a few hundred to a few thousand characters in length and 
asked students to respond to a list of quotations from classical, 
historical, and archival texts. The assumptions that underlay 
this conventional strategy was that working with cases drawn 
from primary sources was the best way to design solutions 
for administrative and cultural problems both in real-life 
situations and in written examinations. Zhu Xi’s question 
signalled the intellectual and political challenge that the Neo-
Confucian movement which he spearheaded would pose to the 
Song government and his peers. His question was based on the 
belief that someone’s ability to serve in government depended 
on moral insight, for those who possessed that capacity could 
lead a moral transformation of the polity. His attempts to 
reform the examinations in this way eventually bore some 
result by the mid-thirteenth century when the court and many 
examiners began to support his reading of the textual record 
and his political theory. Perhaps we shouldn’t be too surprised. 
When examination time comes around in our large lecture 
classes, we too may be tempted to replace lengthy examinations 
with IDs, passages, and short essay questions with the one 
question of what students have learned from reading the 
textbook and listening to lectures.
In sum, I conclude from years of reading centuries-old 
examination papers, that institutions, however much they 
may seem reminiscent of the old political history, remain 
relevant. They remain relevant in particular when we analyze 
them not as “timeless institutional structures of the Chinese 
state”12 but as a living history of individuals and collectives 
working within them and reshaping them. Institutions think, 
as the anthropologist Mary Douglas reminded us decades ago, 
they produce categories, metaphors and logical operations 
that shape the thinking of individuals.13 The Chinese civil 
service examinations did that, just as national examinations 
and universities do today. They tested the skills that were 
deemed relevant for a statesperson centuries ago. A classical 
education was deemed relevant, as it was for European political 
elites until the twentieth century. What sorts of a politics they 
encouraged, what critiques were launched against them and 
in their defense, why they lasted in spite of the critiques and 
the hundreds of thousands if not millions of failures, these 
are the sorts of questions that a broader political history 
should engage. These are also questions that I hope to revisit 
in the long-term future in a global and comparative history of 
examinations.
Networks and political imaginaries: the Song empire
When we break formal institutions down in the way I have 
sketched above, we become aware of a far more complicated 
web of relationships, informal structures, networks that form, 
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expand, or contract. Informal structures are typically not 
captured in the histories of formal institutions but they often 
tell us a lot about the formation and impact of institutions and 
regulations, changes therein, and social and political power. 
This is a lesson I also learned from tracing the history of one 
of the foremost of institutions, at least I think it is that in the 
minds of many among us: the state or the polity. I am here 
not so much interested in the economic, financial, or military 
processes of modern state formation as these have been well 
researched particularly in European history, but more in the 
following questions: How was the polity imagined? What 
might the average person in the provinces have known about 
it and how did such persons describe their relationship to 
it? Further, did it matter in the longer term what sorts of 
images of the polity were available and by whom these were 
shared? (I will stick with the polity because that term carries 
the connotation of political society and thus comes closer to 
my intent to connect formal and informal social and state 
organizations.)
What “China” has been in history is not as simple a question as 
it might seem. Whereas nowadays Chinese textbooks propose 
that China is a sovereign country with a continuous history 
of 5000 years, historical textbooks from a thousand years ago 
were far less confident about the coherence of the Chinese 
territories over the course of time. The most prominent 
example of this more sober view of the ability of Chinese 
states to maintain control over their territories came from the 
second most famous Chinese historian, Sima Guang 司馬光 
(1019-1086). In 1061 he presented a memorial in which he 
underscored that times of divided rule had historically been 
dominant in Chinese history: “In these 1700 or so years [from 
the move of the Eastern Zhou capital in the eight century BCE 
until the foundation of the Song] there have only been 500 
or so in which the realm was united”.14 Sima Guang’s main 
audience for this statement was Song Emperor Renzong  
仁宗 (r. 1023–63). He impressed the prevalence of imperial 
collapse on the emperor while urging him to devote himself 
energetically to the affairs of the imperial state. A century 
later Sima Guang’s observation about the longue durée of 
Chinese history began to make far more of an impact. It was 
repeated many times in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 
It was quoted in chronologies of Chinese history that were 
incised on stone stelae and displayed in public spaces and 
that were reprinted in textbooks; it was also excerpted in 
encyclopedias and anthologies. By then the audience for Sima 
Guang’s words on Chinese political history had expanded to 
include the reading public at large - which as we have seen 
by the twelfth and thirteenth century included hundreds of 
thousands of examination candidates and even more students 
in the southern half of what we now call China. Discontinuity 
and multi-state rule struck them too and these were for many 
among them problems that ought to be addressed.
In my most recent book, forthcoming from Harvard 
University Asia Center, I propose that a sense of belonging to 
a territorially defined unitary state emerged as a widely shared 
feeling among Chinese elites from the twelfth century onwards. 
This state was supposed to cover roughly all territories from 
where the great walls were imagined to have been in the north, 
down to where the most southward of the sacred mountains 
was located, east to the coastline, and west to where the course 
of the major east-west rivers ended. I further propose that 
this kind of political imaginary has played a critical role in 
fostering elite support for large unified empires in the last 700 
years of Chinese history, i.e. from the Yuan Dynasty (1276-
1368) to the twentieth century. This sense of belonging itself 
was not new (it was based on models outlined in the classics 
of early imperial times) but it was first widely articulated in 
twelfth-century documents of all sorts. How did such a shift in 
the history of Chinese political culture come about?
There are two factors that I would like to focus on today, one 
that relates to longer-term structural changes and another 
that underscores the importance of political events in cultural 
historical changes. The reproduction of Sima Guang’s finding 
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about the discontinuity of Chinese history was part of a larger 
structural change in political communication between the 
eleventh and thirteenth centuries. Sima Guang’s memorial 
belonged to a repertoire of texts relating to the history and 
current affairs of the Song Dynasty that had once been the 
exclusive domain of the court and high officialdom but that 
moved decisively in the hands of the literati. The literati or the 
scholars were like their European equivalents, the literati, not 
just literate, they were the cultural elite, they were conversant 
in the cultural skills requisite of the scholar-official. Materials 
that began to circulate among literati included single-sheet 
official documents, court gazettes, and archival compilations 
relating to the business of the reigning dynasty that were by 
law restricted to either specific court bureaux or at best to 
the offices of local officials. There were also maps, atlases, 
military treatises, historical and military geographies, local and 
empire-wide gazetteers, diplomatic treatises and reports, and 
intelligence communications. Some of this material survives; 
we also know about the trade in official news and state archival 
materials because scholars discussed them in letters and in 
notebooks or because they listed them in their library catalogs. 
Much of this material circulated through hand copying but it is 
no coincidence that the breakthrough of the print medium can 
similarly be dated to the twelfth century in Song China. Even 
though it had been invented centuries earlier, in the seventh 
or eighth century (there still is some debate), it was only in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries that woodblock printing began 
to be used for all manner of written texts and increasingly 
also for the notebooks and the correspondence of Song literati 
themselves. 
In other words, a new information regime was being 
established, one in which political literacy was a prerogative 
of the cultured elite. The examinations played a critical role 
in this - arguments were formulated based on cases drawn 
not only from classical and historical texts but also from 
the archives of the reigning dynasty. Political literacy was, 
moreover, critical beyond study and examination halls. 
Current information was necessary for political networking 
and had also become part of elite social discourse. 
Such information needs and the networks that developed 
to satisfy them exerted pressure on the institutions that had 
been set up to streamline communication between the center 
and the local level during the early days of the dynasty. The 
central bureau where the court gazettes were compiled, for 
example, became the object of infiltration and bribery. Literati 
demand for restricted materials also led to waves of publishing 
regulations legislating in ever greater detail the penalties 
for leaking, hand copying, and printing different types of 
materials. Times of increasing government restrictions and 
times of relaxation followed in turn, as they tend to do in 
authoritarian regimes past and present; the court remained 
ambivalent about publicity and always retained censorship as 
an option. Looked at from the longue durée of Chinese history, 
it becomes evident, however, that over the course of the twelfth 
century the court retreated from an interventionist position 
in the production and dissemination of current affairs texts 
and moved towards an implicit recognition of the information 
needs of officials and scholars. Rather than to the limits of 
the pre-modern state, I would attribute the court’s retreat to a 
tacit acknowledgement of the benefits of selective publication. 
Gone was the singular focus on secrecy, which had been the 
cornerstone of imperial information policy since the days of 
the legalist advisers of the first emperor in the third century 
BCE. 
Let me sound a note of caution to what was indeed a very 
precocious information culture in the history of humanity. 
The partial disclosure and the discussion of the state’s archive 
and current affairs need not be interpreted as the arrival of 
a public sphere and a growing gap between state and civil 
society as European theoreticians might like to predict. The 
leaking of current affairs to office-holders and non-office 
holders alike can in the case of late imperial Chinese history 
be seen as crucial elements in the consolidation of imperial 
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rule. The archive placed both court and dynasty firmly at the 
center of literati networks and interests. Secrecy/censorship 
on the one hand and publicity on the other can in retrospect 
be seen as parallel processes that helped cement the continued 
collaboration of growing numbers of cultural elites. 
Structural change tends to come about as a result of longer-
term developments and critical events that offer a sudden 
opportunity for a change in power relationships to take 
hold. One event played a crucial role in the larger structural 
transformation in political communication that I have 
sketched above. The Song Capital of Kaifeng, a city of well 
over one million people, had fallen to Jurchen troops in 1126-
27. With the division of the Chinese territories into mainly 
two halves, the north ruled by the Jin Dynasty and the south 
by the Song, Sima Guang’s historical observation, offered 65 
years earlier, that imperial unity is easily lost had materialized 
once again. War and displacement did not lead to an overall 
economic crisis but multi-state rule was experienced as a 
political crisis, “a shame to be washed away”. The events of 
1126-27, referred to in Chinese as the Jingkang Crisis, played a 
pivotal role not only, as has been suggested before, in bringing 
about longer-term social change but also in consolidating the 
developments in political communication. These had been 
gaining momentum since the latter half of the eleventh century 
but only broke through after the 1120s. The geopolitical crisis 
increased demand for texts about current affairs. I would 
conclude that it also brought with it a strengthening of elite 
commitment to the imperial state and not, as social and 
intellectual historians have previously proposed, a turn away 
from the center and imperial government and towards local 
concerns.15
Digital perspectives on collective action
Political history has been reinvented not only through the 
discovery of new sources or the impact of new questions but 
also through the adoption and adaptation of new methods and 
new theoretical perspectives. In the final part of today’s lecture 
I want to dwell a bit on the opportunities and the challenges 
provided by digital methods. 
I proposed earlier that an imperial mission (i.e., the 
responsibility to defend a and to restore a unitary state) 
spread through the circulation of archival texts and private 
commentary about the Song state in literati networks; in other 
words this particular kind of patriotism was not in the first 
instance instilled by a beleaguered state and its institutional 
machinery. I reached this conclusion in part through a series 
of experiments in which I read notes on conversations and 
reading materials with the help of digital text analysis, network 
analysis, and geographic analysis. The combination of these 
methods and more traditional close reading allowed me to 
systematically track and map who contributed what kinds of 
information from where and to whom. I could also explore 
how the communication networks of individuals compared 
to each other, both within generations and across time, and 
measured against a range of variables. On this basis I could 
hypothesize that whereas social relationships such as marriages 
may well have been contracting in geographic scope (put 
simply, more families were marrying more locally in the 
twelfth century than they were in the eleventh), the geographic 
range of information networks remained at a minimum cross-
regional and may have even expanded - literati across the 
empire kept in touch with each other, reinforced their bonds, 
and thus constituted themselves as a political community. 
(If this were a lecture other than an inaugural one I would at 
this point if not earlier have shown some slides of maps and 
networks, but in keeping with good form I will continue with 
the lectio and trust that you can imagine what these might 
have looked like.)
How the geography of communication related to the 
formation, maintenance, or fragmentation of polities remains 
to be further explored, also in cross-cultural comparison - this 
is a question that I and my research team here in Leiden are 
tackling. I want to finish with a few brief remarks on what 
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innovation in digital methodology could further mean for the 
future of Chinese political history. I will focus my comments 
on another subfield in political history, the history of collective 
action which is where a good deal of my time will go in the 
immediate future. 
Moments of collective action have sparked the imagination 
of Chinese intellectuals throughout Chinese history through 
to the present. Early twentieth-century radicals recalled the 
actions of Chen Dong 陳東 (1086-1127), an Imperial College 
student who voiced the concerns of students and other 
inhabitants of Kaifeng in the 1120s and who became a martyr. 
Chen Dong was one of many tens of thousands who appeared 
on the streets of Kaifeng to protest the Song court’s acceptance 
of the conditions imposed by the invading Jurchen troops and 
to call for the dismissal of those who advocated submission 
- in the twentieth century the link with the embarrassing 
terms accepted in Beijing at the end of WWI which led to 
the student movement of 1919 was easily made. These and 
similar moments have become iconic but the crucial questions 
have remained unanswered: What made this kind of student 
mobilization possible? What role did student networks play in 
the restoration of the Song state in the south? Did the court 
successfully dismantle student networks in the decades after 
the 1120s or did they continue to shape political culture? Such 
questions were difficult if not impossible to answer before - it 
is not within the reach of most historians to analyze the lives, 
behaviors, relationships, and opinions of hundreds of people 
at once - especially not if we have to read through the collected 
oeuvre of hundreds of persons, all in classical Chinese. This 
is why studies about student activism during this period have 
predominantly been institutional histories of the Imperial 
College, narratives of the demonstrations and their aftermath, 
or short biographies of some of the martyrs. We are now, 
however, developing new and adapting existing methods in 
data mining and visualization that allow us to look at the 
thousands of letters and other writings that remain from a few 
dozen of these students16 to see whether and when coalitions 
formed, whether they were sustained over time, and what other 
kinds of relationships (family, hometown, common teacher, 
etc.) fostered mobilization efforts. 
Similarly we can take a fresh look at the history of parties or 
factionalism. The standard story is that there was no room for 
political groupings in Chinese political culture. Officials faced 
the emperor as individuals; forming a party based on shared 
interests appeared to be self-interested and thus immoral. It 
could also be perceived as a direct challenge to the authority 
of the emperor. Hence the more pejorative term factionalism 
is used to describe party formation. Many historians, past 
and present, have tended to single out moments of factional 
strife at court and held those up as cautionary tales of the 
negative impact of divisive politics - the Chinese historians 
in the audience will most likely be familiar with the Great 
Proscription of the second century in which about 200 people 
were accused of and persecuted for forming a political alliance 
or the Yuanyou blacklist which included the names of 309 
alleged members of a political faction.17 
I tend to agree with those historians who propose that in fact 
factional politics was always there in late imperial China.18 A 
seventeenth-century historian, Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619-
92), pointed out that factionalism was not an exceptional 
thing in Chinese history, he noted that from the Song Dynasty 
onwards it became part of being a literatus.19 Networking 
was intertwined with the career of literati at various stages. 
It was essential when preparing and sitting examinations, 
seeking appointment and re-appointment, or when obtaining 
patronage for other types of employment. Networking involved 
literati in political coalitions. If it is the case that networking 
of this kind was necessary for careers and therefore pervasive, 
it follows that historians need to understand how factional 
politics worked not only at the top but also in the provinces. 
Again a methodological problem arises: how do we get a grip 
on the question of how factional politics operated in the vast 
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collections of private writings? One could opt for a case study 
approach focusing on known individuals, but again we believe 
that the larger question of how far factional politics filtered 
through to the provinces can be better answered by devising 
methods to explore the entirety of the existing record. With a 
group of postdoctoral and doctoral students I have begun to 
analyze how the names of the 309 men who appeared on the 
list I last mentioned can be used to explore such questions: 
When and how did their names begin to cluster in the record? 
Did the lists reflect real political coalitions, were these random 
listings by paranoid leaders, or, were they the invention of later 
historians?20 Around what issues did coalitions form? What 
was the response to factional lists in the provinces? We suspect 
and hope that such an approach will open up new perspectives 
in the Chinese history of political practice and participation. 
We will then also be better positioned to undertake cross-
cultural comparisons. 
More than fifty years ago Schauel N Eisenstadt undertook 
a comprehensive comparison of “The Political Systems 
of Empires”. He set out to compare the extent to which 
social groups in different societies could participate in the 
formulation of the goals of polities and the criteria they used 
to evaluate such goals.21 The comparison was well informed 
but it was also heavily skewed by European standards of what 
constituted proper political participation (i.e., the autonomy 
of cities, the separation of church and state, the power of the 
church, etc.). Following the cultural turn, we may now be in 
a position to write a comparative history of political practice 
from a postcolonial perspective, in which we no longer assume 
progression towards European-style liberal democracy as the 
standard but fully engage with different modes of political 
communication.22 
The above examples of student mobilization and factional 
politics illustrate that this type of new political history requires 
that historians are actively involved in the design of digital 
methods and tools (the distinction is I think an artificial one 
- tools also consist of methods). Scientists have traditionally 
been involved in the design of instruments; sinologists have 
not been an exception. The first professor of Chinese at 
Leiden University, Gustave Schlegel (1840-1903), compiled 
a Dutch-Chinese dictionary 5217 pages thick, whose title I 
can only partially pronounce because the first part contains 
a transcription in a southern Min dialect. The Nederlandsch-
Chineesch woordenboek met de transcriptie der Chineesche 
karakters in het Tsiang-tsiu dialect (Dutch-Chinese dictionary 
with transcription of Chinese characters in the Zhangzhou 
dialect, 1886-1890) was admittedly not only intended for 
scholarly purposes it also served to help translators working 
in the Dutch colonies where southern Chinese dialects were 
standard.23 Middle-period historians of previous generations 
created concordances, indexes, bibliographies, dictionaries, 
and, in the case of the exceptionally foresighted Robert 
Hartwell, databases. Our fear of the digital and the still 
lingering misgivings about the quantitative history of the 
1950s and 60s should not prevent us from fashioning the 
tools that will allow us to tackle new questions - this of course 
on the foundation of all good historical and humanities 
scholarship: the critical reading and evaluation of the textual 
and material record.24
I hope I have convinced some of you that Chinese political 
history is worth reinventing. This reinvention need not result 
in yet another new political history but I hope it will turn 
political history once more into an integrative history, a history 
that integrates insights from institutional, social, cultural, and 
intellectual history as well as political science in the study of 
political ideas, practices, decisions, and institutions. 
Let me add, in conclusion, that I could have told a similar 
story of neglect for many other fields of Chinese history. One 
example will suffice. Most economic historians nowadays are 
aware of and make brief mention of “the industrial revolution” 
of the Song period referring to large-scale iron production, 
shipbuilding, the development of joint-stock companies 
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and paper money, and accelerating commercialization and 
urbanization that took place between the eleventh and 
thirteenth centuries. However, even though most European 
universities devote entire courses to the European Industrial 
Revolution there is not one in which students can learn about 
the so-called first industrial revolution. When I proposed the 
topic to a well-known BBC radio show, which had earlier 
broadcast a very successful series on the British Industrial 
Revolution, the host, very uncharacteristically, ordered his 
closest assistant to note the idea down. The latter also started 
worrying immediately that he would not be able to locate three 
people to talk about the subject. Chinese economic history is 
still barely taught in European universities. I hope that when 
the next chair in Chinese history looks back on the twenty 
years or so that lie ahead of us she will have a different story to 
tell. We owe it to the citizens of tomorrow to fully incorporate 
the histories of non-European places in universities and 
schools at all levels. 
It is a good habit to conclude this ceremony with a few words 
of thanks. It is a great honor and also a great responsibility 
to have been nominated for this unique professorship in 
Chinese history. For this honor and also for the trust that has 
been invested in me I thank the Executive Board (College van 
Bestuur), the Board of the Faculty of Humanities, and all who 
have contributed to the nomination. 
The prospect of working with an unusual group of staff 
members in Chinese Studies, Area Studies, History, and 
Computer sciences eased the difficult decision to accept this 
new challenge considerably. I thank all of them and also 
the students of the Leiden Institute for Area Studies for the 
warm welcome they have given me during the past year. I owe 
special thanks to Maghiel van Crevel, the current director of 
LIAS, for his incredibly dynamic and inspiring leadership - I 
really wanted him to deliver this presentation on institutional 
history; never before have I met anyone who can speak lyrically 
and for hours about the institutional context of the university, 
I can only assume that this is part of the profession in Chinese 
poetry.
The journey that has led to today’s events has been a long one, 
even though everything may in retrospect appear to have gone 
very quickly. During the last twenty years I have been able 
to rely on the steadfast support of Peter Bol. I learned from 
him that the art of this profession consists in learning to ask 
fundamental questions, based on a close and critical familiarity 
with the source materials. He has also let me personally 
experience how quality teaching and quality research can go 
together. I thank him and Satomi Matsumura, whose Japanese 
classes I still miss, also for their presence today.
My intellectual, professional, and personal debts have 
accumulated over the years. I have learned in all sorts of ways 
foremost from my fellow students at Harvard University, my 
colleagues at the Harvard-Yenching Library, and my colleagues 
in history in Knoxville, Oxford, and London. I have, moreover, 
been able to count on the input and good humor from the 
ever-increasing number and very collegial group of Song 
historians, around 200 in the west alone and a few more in East 
Asia. I hope that I will be able to continue to count on their 
support in the future. In particular, I would like to thank a few 
sinologists and historians for their enduring interest in my 
trajectory and for their presence today: Nicolas Standaert and 
Carine Defoort from Leuven and Rana Mitter from Oxford. 
For my mother, Mimi Borremans, it will be a great relief that 
I landed well. I am grateful today for her advice many years 
ago that I should go for a more established institution when 
I proposed upon graduating from high school to set up my 
own university in the village of Everbeek. Mom, I am glad that 
you can also be here today despite great inconvenience. To my 
sisters and brothers, Nest, Lu, Annemie, Zif, Leo, Lode, and 
Dirk, my nephews and nieces, aunts and uncles, especially the 
biekish who are also here today, to my cousins, and to the loved 
ones of all of them, your solidarity has always been a source of 
inspiration. For their presence, continued support, and their 
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healthy sense of perspective I also thank Mary Lucal, Neula 
Kerr-Boyle, and Dagmar Boer. To all who came to celebrate 
today, a heartfelt thanks.
Ik heb gezegd.
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